Kingdom of Afghanistan TNO RPG

The crisis in the Afghan government will reach its climax when Prime Minister Musa Shafiq announces his resignation to the cabinet, citing Zahir Shah's lack of confidence in him. This will be followed by a coup d'état by republican military officers, who will declare the establishment of a neutral republican government led by the Hezb-e Melliye Afghanistan, or National Party of Afghanistan.

When these revolutionaries, led by Hafizullah Amin, seize control of the state, it will be announced that Zahir Shah has been exiled to the United States. The ideology of Afghanistan will become either the Vision of Chiang Kai-shek or the Vision of Wang Jingwei.

Daoud Khan's Coup: Multiple cascading government crises, culminating in the failure to effectively respond to the famine, will trigger mass unrest. This will lead to Daoud Khan launching a coup against King Mohammad Zahir Shah, with the support of progressive military officers and a foreign benefactor. He will then create the National Revolutionary Party, based on the ideology of his main benefactor.

This benefactor can be:

Azad Hind and the social nationalism she espouses. Dawood Khan will conclude that the best method is to create a party-state structure based on anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Turkey, which will prompt Daoud Khan to draw inspiration from the modernization programs of Atatürk and Reza Shah. He plans to establish a one-party state focused on Westernization and modernization of Afghanistan. Kemalism will be established in Afghanistan. Japan, which will prompt Daoud Khan to draw inspiration from the anti-colonialist revolutions observed in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Accordingly, he will want to use the NRP as a means of inciting the Afghan population to revolutionary nationalist renewal.

Republican coup The crisis in the Afghan government will reach its climax when Prime Minister Musa Shafiq announces his resignation to the cabinet, citing Zahir Shah's lack of confidence in him.

This could be followed by a coup d'état carried out by Republican military officers led by Daoud Khan, who will claim that the deterioration of political control in Afghanistan has forced him to take decisive action. It will be announced that Zahir Shah will be deported to the United States.

The Maoist Revolution: The crisis in the Wolesi Jirga will be overshadowed by events elsewhere. Rebellious ethnic minorities in Hazarajat and Tajik-majority areas will launch a general uprising, demanding a fair distribution of development aid and infrastructure. This will be followed by a popular uprising in Kabul by armed leftist militants demanding the establishment of a "new democratic" regime.

When these militants, led by Akram Yari, take control of the state, it will be announced that Zahir Shah has been deported to the United States of America and Afghanistan will follow the path of Maoism.

The crisis in the Wolesi Jirga will be overshadowed by events elsewhere. Increasingly powerful Islamist forces, frustrated by the past decade of secular rule, will launch an uprising in the Panjshir Valley. This will lead to a broader popular uprising of armed Islamists demanding the creation of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

When these militants, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, seize control of the state, it will be announced that Zahir Shah has been deported to the United States of America, and Afghanistan will embark on the path of Islamic nationalism.

The 1973 Government Crisis. Growing social tensions, ethnic and labor unrest, and the general ineffectiveness of the Kabul government would reach their peak during the 1971 famine, caused by heavy snowfalls in the Hindu Kush. After the inadequate response to the famine led to numerous deaths, growing popular unrest, coupled with the inability of the Wolesi Jirga—the House of the People, Afghanistan's legislative body—to resolve its conflict, would add fuel to the fire as Zahir Shah's reign faced its gravest challenges. Below are the various outcomes of the crisis.

The crisis in the Afghan government will reach its climax when Prime Minister Musa Shafiq announces his resignation to the cabinet, citing Zahir Shah's lack of confidence in him.

In this case, his replacement will be Khalilullah Khalili, a member of the Wolesi Jirga and a close adviser to Zahir Shah. Prime Minister Khalili will immediately announce the dissolution of all other parties in favor of the monarchist Hezb-e-Ittehad-e-Melli, or National Unity Party. Consequently, Afghanistan will move toward absolute monarchy.

New Democracy The crisis in Afghanistan's government will reach a climax when Prime Minister Musa Shafiq announces his resignation to the cabinet, condemning the king's refusal to implement real reforms to fix the system.

A mass rally in Kabul demanding political reform will force Zahir Shah to sign the bill on political parties. Consequently, Musa Shafiq will be reappointed prime minister with the support of all other parties sitting in the Wolesi Jirga. From now on, Afghanistan will be a semi-constitutional monarchy.

Elections of 1969 Shaken by economic crisis and external threats, the Afghan political scene would face large-scale destabilization and radicalization following the departure of Zahir Shah's appointed prime minister in 1967. While Foreign Minister Mohammad Nur Ahmad Ettemadi would be appointed interim prime minister, he would spend his time in office attempting to resolve the volatile foreign policy situation and reverse past unpopular policies.

Badakhshi's Appointment: With the upcoming elections, it appears Etemadi will lose the trust of Zahir Shah, who will appoint Tahir Badakhshi—a native of Tajikistan—as his new prime minister. Known for founding the leftist-nationalist Revolutionary Organization of Workers of Afghanistan and his opposition to so-called "national oppression," Badakhshi's appointment is seen as a sign of respect for the country's disaffected minorities.

Etemadi's Reappointment The upcoming elections will demonstrate that Etemadi has won the unwavering favor of Zahir Shah, who has reconfirmed his appointment as Prime Minister of Afghanistan. With his new mandate, he promises to continue addressing the challenging economic situation while simultaneously pursuing Maiwandwal's vision of building socialism within Afghanistan's monarchical system.

Mohammadi's appointment With the upcoming elections, it appears Etemadi will lose the trust of Zahir Shah, who will appoint the theocrat Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi as the new prime minister. Elected to parliament on a platform of combating creeping Marxist influence, his appointment marks a new turning point for the secular state—the complete Islamization of all of Afghanistan.

Elections of 1965 After convening a Loya Jirga—a grand council—the previous year to draft a new constitution, the 1965 parliamentary elections, as expected, resulted in the election of a host of local landowners, and the incumbent Prime Minister, Yusuf Khan, was reappointed. However, the approval of Khan's new cabinet would be blocked by student protests backed by Maoists, leading to the army opening fire on the protesters, killing three of them. This would force Zahir Shah to appoint a new prime minister to replace the clearly failed Yousuf Khan—but his decision would be left to his own discretion.

appointment of Mainwandwal

Zahir Shah will appoint Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, the founder of the Progressive Democracy Party of Afghanistan, as his new prime minister. Maiwandwal advocates building social democracy within the monarchy, strengthening democracy, and initiating economic reforms. His undisguised pro-American sentiments give rise to predictions of a new course in Afghan diplomacy—away from Germany and Japan. Farhang's appointment Zahir Shah may choose leftist reformist and co-author of the constitution, Mir Mohammad Sediq Farhang. Known for his leftist tendencies and previous imprisonment for leading the liberal reformist movement in 1949, Farhang, a reformist socialist, will express a desire to dismantle the still-prevalent feudal system in Afghanistan and restore economic growth. Farhad's appointment: Zahir Shah will choose to appoint the former mayor of Kabul, founder of the Afghan Social Democratic Party, and social liberal Ghulam Mohammad Farhad. Known for his business connections in Germany and for drawing ideological inspiration from there, he will redouble his pro-Pashtun rhetoric, calling for the Pashtunization of the multi-ethnic Afghan state and the implementation of modernist and social democratic policies.

Afghanistan can safely be called one of the most culturally diverse countries in Asia. The least diverse part of the country is its southeast, where the Pashtuns predominate. However, even here, in certain regions such as Ghazni and Helmand, there are Parsiwan minorities, and in Nangarhar, there are Pashai, Brahui, and Nuristani minorities.

Western Afghanistan is dominated by Parsivan culture, but there is a Pashtun minority in Farah, and Charaimaqs are also present in Herat. In the central part of the country, Charaimaqs predominate (in the Ghor region) and Hazaras (in the Uruzgan region). Charaimaqs also live alongside Turkmen and Pashtun minorities in Badghis, and Hazara influence extends to Wardak, where Pashtuns also live.

Northern Afghanistan is no less diverse. In Faryab and Jowzdan, Uzbek culture predominates, with minorities of Pashtuns and Parsivans, respectively. Mazar-i-Sharif is home to a mix of Parsivans, Pashtuns, and Uzbeks, while in Qataghan, Tajiks replace Parsivans. The rest of the country is dominated by Tajiks, who in Kabul intermingle with Pashtuns to form a Tajik-Pashtun culture. Finally, the Pamiri people live in Gorno-Badakhshan, annexed from Tajikistan.

During the tenure of Prime Minister Sardar Mohammed Hashim Khan, relations between Afghanistan and the Axis powers reached a historic high. Even the replacement of his brother in 1946 did not stop this; continued pro-Axis sentiment and aid from both new great powers flowed in a steady stream. However, the split of the Axis into the Unity Pact and the Co-Prosperity Sphere left the Afghans in an awkward position. While they still reaped the benefits of both partnerships, Afghanistan itself was geographically too distant to reap the full benefits of the cooperation.

There were many complicating factors. Afghanistan served as a gateway to Central Asia for the Turkestan Legion and the Pakistan Movement. Intervention in both regions secured Afghanistan's role as a regional power, but instilled in its neighbors a fear of Afghanistan; the only thing that prevented them from uniting and overthrowing Kabul was the still-fierce internecine conflicts in both regions.

Despite the successes of the 1950s against the government of a unified India and in Central Asia, the question of "Pashtunistan" as a concept remains unresolved. Today, the status quo favors the Afghan state. But trouble is brewing. Discontent and ongoing clashes in the new lands, hostility with Delhi, and Daoud Khan's staunch Pashtun nationalist stance leave Afghanistan with no choice but to defuse this ticking time bomb once and for all—or let it explode and pay the price. The closer the emerging Marxist and reformist influences, coming from all sides, come, the more threats to the monarchical order emerge, influencing political debate and struggle within Afghanistan. Opposition movements remain underground, with dubious reports claiming their existence. Daoud Khan's accession to the throne in 1953 accelerated this trend, further fueled by the Pakistani and Central Asian conflicts. But the current disorganization is only temporary: if parties emerge again, they will be tougher and stronger—having learned from their mistakes. The "Two Mohammeds" is the unofficial nickname given to the two cousins, the King of Afghanistan and his prime minister, who have been the center of Afghan politics for a decade. At the top sits the velvet-gloved reformist Mohammed Zahir Shah; his supporters are neutralists, moderates, conservatives, traditionalist aristocrats, as well as Uzbeks and Tajiks. Below him stands the staunch modernist Mohammed Daoud Khan, a favorite of Germanophiles and Japanophiles and a friend of all Pashtun nationalists and radicals. As the third decade of the Shah's reign and the first decade of Daoud Khan's tenure as prime minister approach, serious differences in their once-friendly relationship are beginning to emerge.

With the consolidation of Tajik lands, Zahir Shah can rest on his laurels. But his reign is under threat: political movements are growing, Delhi, Central Asia, and Xinjiang are preparing to take revenge, and Afghanistan's patrons are descending into chaos. Worse, his cousin, the prime minister, has his own ambitions and will not limit himself to loyal service. But the Shah has more pressing concerns: he must bring Afghanistan another decade of success, so that every citizen can enter the 1970s even happier and wealthier.

Mohammed Zahir Shah has ruled Afghanistan since 1933. For the first two decades, he ruled alongside his uncles, who took turns serving as prime minister. First, it was Sardar Mohammed Hashim Khan, who imposed his despotic will on Afghanistan for seventeen years. He was then succeeded by Sardar Mohammed Mahmud Khan, his predecessor's brother, who oversaw the slow liberalization of Afghanistan until the country's economy collapsed and irrigation projects failed.

In 1953, the Shah's cousin, Daoud Khan, became prime minister, overseeing massive development and modernization of the country, financed by foreign aid. The fall of Russian communism led to the Germans and Japanese taking their positions as Afghanistan's main sponsors, funding 40% of the Afghan budget—a large sum compared to the 7% of tax revenue. Their support enabled Afghanistan to become a powerful regional power, earning this title through well-calculated invasions and diplomatic maneuvers: attacks on Tajiks as far as the Shahdara River, support for the invasion of Turkestan legionaries, and protection of the All-India Muslim League and its leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, from enemies in Delhi.

Zahir Shah's decision to invade Balochistan, providing sanctuary to the Pakistani movement after Delhi declared a state of emergency in the Western Provinces, gave way to a partial solution: the breach of the Durand Line and the annexation of Quetta and northern Balochistan. This was followed by the formation of the FPCA and the subjugation of the Khanate of Kalat after Afghan forces joined forces with Pakistani forces to keep the Indian government at its gates. Jinnah's death left Afghanistan with two protectorates, access to the sea, and another step toward the dream of Pashtunistan. The icing on the cake: the recognition of Calcutta as the official government of India, pleasing Tokyo and infuriating Delhi.